OUT OF ORDER

TAKE ONE

The world is fucked, so let me eat.

i can explain it for you but i can’t understand it for you

crap

i envy people who don’t know you

unseasoned cabbage

i’m not sure what’s wrong

with

you

Yesterday p a r c h e d, for a sound of your voice but oh, today I caught the sunrise. By noon I restarted my phone three times because I couldn’t believe it. Couldn’t see how you wouldn’t respond with a voice memo. After I told you in the one I sent you, I’m scared.

In fact, at the very heart of our environmental decision-making is a reality of political bargaining; the Paris Agreement encapsulates the key objective of environmental decision-making, the premise that GHG emissions should remain ‘well below 2°’. Of course, both ethical and economic dimensions may have come into the discussions that built this politically acceptable threshold; national interests built on the economic paradigm, and the principle of ‘developed countries’ taking the lead in ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ bearing an ethical dimension. But if environmental decisions were solely premised on economic efficiency, the status quo might be the attractive option for many countries, rather than investing in green energies.

Is it just me? r a w you’re making me, by leaving me hanging from the ceiling by my toenails as I wait, as I wait for you to tell me, you might be scared too.

You may not be scared the way I am. You may not feel as if with every second wasted, a clock far enough in the distance I shouldn’t hear but I do, gongs in the distance because time, we’re fighting over air and losing, we’re all slowly l o s i n g.

Don’t ignore the early signs of cancer.

Don’t press on the red button.

Don’t run at the swimming pool.

Don’t admit that you’re wrong.

Don’t laugh.

Don’t try.

Don’t get tired.

Sagoff’s criticism targets the inherent reliance on economic forms of ‘valuation’ and the pretence of objectiveness in measuring economic costs and benefits. Adam Smith explained the concept of economic value in terms of two different meanings: either 'the utility of some particular object' or 'the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys.' Smith called the first sort 'value in use' and the second 'value in exchange.' (Sagoff). And based on such valuations, decisions should be made on 'maximising net benefits.'

Don’t suggest I train for a marathon

to raise money for another petition,

I’ve signed so many.

Don’t leave the coffee cup on the table without a coaster.

Don’t despair about imminent disaster.

Don’t procrastinate on important tasks.

Don’t rush.

Don’t forget to turn off the lights.

Don’t start a diet.

Don’t tell me to fix this.

Don’t pretend.

Don’t cough.

Don’t tell me I’m wrong.

Don’t tell me I’m right.

Don’t apologize to me and then buy a latte.

After you continued to not respond, I wrote you a letter. I burned it. I melted it. I watched it turn to ash. I

scooped up the ash left in the grate once the fire died.

Nothing, nothing’s of my doing and nothing is what I’ll do.

That’s not true.

Give me a moment before I try.

But first, let me taste things.

FUEL

onion gross

coleslaw tangy

watermelon refreshing

cauliflower carmelised

seaweed often with a hint of the ocean

tofu absorbent

vinegar acidic

basil Greek

salt enhances flavors, adding a savory twist

broccolini similar to broccoli, but milder

pretzels with a variable texture

soy sauce goes with everything

buckwheat an ingredient

chili flakes

COSTS

Planet Earth: 33 quadrillion dollars

Human life: 6.1 million dollars

Mt. Everest: 370 million dollars

The Pacific Ocean: 24 trillion dollars

The Mediterranean Sea: 450 billion dollars

Apple: 2.70 dollars

Gum wrapper: 9.99 dollars

The Old Testament: 25.99 dollars

The New Testament: 24.95 dollars

Cow: 2,500 dollars

Oil: 87.30 dollars per barrel

Liter of water: 0.50 dollars

Boeing 737: 89.1 million dollars

CNN: 10 billion dollars

Taste: 3000 dollars

HEADLINES

carbon neutral & geoplastic footprints caps of ice & emission wavelengths aerosols & biogeochemical cycles anthropogenic water bottles & atmospheres of slime forcing an agreement & compromising on neglect cryosphere & climate models drought & uncertainty tipping point of a not big deal & the stagnation of catastrophe sensitivity of water & the hypervigilance of air deforestation of sense & the rising of tree levels ice core blockages & riptide awakenings radiative forcing & beautiful hurricanes extreme weather events

& bland conversation

Feedback loop & propaganda climax greenhouse effect & the sundowning of depression ozone sphere & cigarette buds typical climate patterns & irregular predictions floods of tears & seconds of joy

permafrost & tempheat

ocean amplification & lake degeneration shifting migration patterns & unwieldy pipelines & bagpipes oil as skincare & olives as disposable wind power & bad breath

sun power and red skin sally sells seashells

by the seashore and seahorses

ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

Ready, am I am r e a d y? To be disappointed? For nothing?

Both Sagoff and Ackerman (rightfully) argue that beyond the instrumental value assigned by an economist to ‘things’, there may also be an intrinsic one, which is less instrumental or even anthropocentric (reliant on human welfare). Indeed, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers. Consumption choices measured by the willingness-to-pay, can be trumped by reflective judgements as citizens (Sunstein). A well-functioning democracy should respect the informed judgments of citizens rather than aggregate private consumption choices.

I’m w a i t i n g as a bird flies through dry leaves.

Environmental decisions should not be based on what is economically efficient, but decisions are not based on such a premise anyway. In fact, it is strange to draw a binary and dichotomous account of environmental decision-making that pins economic efficiency against ethics, when other dimensions also inform environmental decisions; such as the protection of human rights, electoral costs to incumbent leaders, political bargaining in the international arena, or even degrees of scientific knowledge.

Buzzing, I’m vibrating for an answer because it’s time for alcohol. I know I shouldn’t have any. I know if I start, I won’t end until I see a message from you on my screen. I’ve lasted, this e l o n g a t e d in nerves, for this long. I’m starting to parch.

Ultimately, granting rights to different entities, such as future generations, rivers, or the Great Barrier Reef, could be a means of reinforcing precaution and protecting the needs and interests of current and future generations. Additionally, this could render environmental decision-making less anthropocentric. It could help reinstate normative priorities and conceptual coherence (Kysar 2012). Perhaps the strongest critique of models of economic efficiency for decision-making is the trivialising of the future (discounting). The concept of intergenerational justice, and constitutional rights for future generations could alleviate this problem.

If it was between me and the world I’d pick the right choice too.

Market allocation cannot overtake political deliberation with respect to policies that involve moral or aesthetic judgement (Sagoff).

The r e s p o n s e I’ve been waiting for, it still hasn’t arrived.

I’ll eat anything.

TAKE TWO

The world is fucked, so let me eat.

It would be a mistake to characterise environmental decision-making as possibly being based on economic efficiency alone. If that were the case, the protection of the rights of individuals wouldn’t matter, and decisions could be made on the basis that the price of a human life is about $6.1 million (Environmental Protection Agency). Governments protect human health and the environment for reasons beyond economic efficiency. Yesterday p a r c h e d, for a sound of your voice but oh, today I caught the sunrise. By noon I restarted my phone three times because I couldn’t believe it. Couldn’t see how you wouldn’t respond with a voice memo. After I told you in the one I sent you, I’m scared. In fact, at the very heart of our environmental decision-making is a reality of political bargaining; the Paris Agreement encapsulates the key objective of environmental decision-making, the premise that GHG emissions should remain ‘well below 2°’. Of course, both ethical and economic dimensions may have come into the discussions that built this politically acceptable threshold; national interests built on the economic paradigm, and the principle of ‘developed countries’ taking the lead in ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ bearing an ethical dimension. But if environmental decisions were solely premised on economic efficiency, the status quo might be the attractive option for many countries, rather than investing in green energies.

Forget about being polite.

Is it just me? When people say they’re scared, doesn’t it make others feel, as if maybe that person needs comforting? r a w you’re making me, by leaving me hanging from the ceiling by my toenails as I wait, as I wait for you to tell me, you might be scared too.

Environmental decisions are not/should not be made on an economic basis alone. First, there is no ‘statistical people’ — indeed, human life is the ultimate example of a value that is not a commodity and does not have a price (Ackerman). You cannot buy the right to kill someone for $6.1 million, nor for any other price. Second, voting is different from buying. Cost-benefit analyses (CBA), which relies on estimates of individuals' preferences as consumers, fails to address the collective choice presented to society by most public health and environmental problems. You may not be scared the way I am. You may not feel as if with every second wasted, a clock far enough in the distance I shouldn’t hear but I do, gongs in the distance because time, we’re fighting over air and losing, we’re all slowly l o s i n g. Sagoff’s criticism targets the inherent reliance on economic forms of ‘valuation’ and the pretence of objectiveness in measuring economic costs and benefits. Adam Smith explained the concept of economic value in terms of two different meanings: either 'the utility of some particular object' or 'the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys.' Smith called the first sort 'value in use' and the second 'value in exchange.' (Sagoff). And based on such valuations, decisions should be made on 'maximising net benefits.'

Don’t ask me to push my foot down, off the table.

Don’t tell me I should try to achieve this, or that or feel,

guilty about here or there.

Don’t suggest I train for a marathon to raise money

or go to a march with a flag I’d have to buy in a store

or another petition, another and another,

there are so many I’ve signed.

However such valuation in instrumental terms risks undervaluing the environment (Sagoff). Cost-benefit analysis cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is entirely reliant on the impossible effort to price the priceless values of life, health, nature, and the future. Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that CBA suffers from four fundamental flaws: 1. The standard economic approaches to valuation are inaccurate and implausible; 2. The use of discounting improperly trivialises future harms and the irreversibility of some environmental problems; 3. The reliance on aggregate, monetised benefits excludes questions of fairness and morality; and 4. The value-laden and complex cost-benefit process is neither objective nor transparent. After you continued to not respond, I wrote you a letter.

Nothing, nothing is of my doing and nothing, is what I’ll do.

I burned it. I melted it. I watched it turn to ash. I scooped up the ash left in the grate once the fire died.

That’s not true. Give me a moment before I try.

But first, let me taste things.

Environmental decisions are not/should not be made on an economic basis alone, because first, there are no ‘statistical people’ — indeed, human life is the ultimate example of a value that is not a commodity and does not have a price (Ackerman). You cannot buy the right to kill someone for $6.1 million, nor for any other price. Second, voting is different from buying. CBA, which relies on estimates of individuals' preferences as consumers, fails to address the collective choice presented to society by most public health and environmental problems. I then took a walk during the time of day when the sun gets tired. Not late enough for dusk so too early in the day for a beer.

Let me know, a pomegranate picked off a tree or a mailbox,

painted like its older sister,

help me walk across the centre of the street without worrying,

if there’s a car waiting. Behind, honking.

I’ve decided to focus absolutely, on s o m e t h i n g else. Therefore, basing environmental decisions on economic efficiency alone is flawed. What is important in the CBA model is that costs and benefits observed by economists reflect a prior determination by the political community, rather than market preferences (Kysar 2012). Otherwise, CBA becomes a crude tool which buries indefensible judgments of morality and politics (Ackerman). Is it wrong, so wrong, to feel as if all of me is waiting, for you to tell me that it’s going to be okay? That I’ll be okay? That being scared, it’s something we all feel. I know that, I know that. But I don’t tell people, too often. In fact, almost never. Never, I’ve never told anyone. It’s not your fault you don’t know, that I haven’t said those three words strung together s i m p l y, you wouldn’t know. Maybe you say it all the time. But I’ve had enough occurrences where I could try to focus on something else and so now, so late, too old, I’m finding out how it feels, to confess something waiting for an answer. Hoping, almost close to praying.

I can’t hear.

Ready, am I am r e a d y? To be disappointed? For you to say nothing? Ethical concerns should not be understood as constructing morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’ decision-making. The ‘ethical’ dimension of environmental decision-making encompasses many of the other dimensions in the debate, including social costs, inequities, concepts of fairness, and protecting the rights of different entities (humans, animals, plants, rivers etc). Both Sagoff and Ackerman (rightfully) argue that beyond the instrumental value assigned by an economist to ‘things’, there may also be an intrinsic one, which is less instrumental or even anthropocentric (reliant on human welfare). Indeed, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers. Consumption choices measured by the willingness-to-pay, can be trumped by reflective judgements as citizens (Sunstein). A well-functioning democracy should respect the informed judgments of citizens rather than aggregate private consumption choices.

We’re trying, they tell us in headlines:

carbon neutral and geoplastic footprints,

caps of ice and emission wavelengths.

Projections of images on top of words

obscure the lie they’re all telling

we hear you. Ackerman and Heinzerling prefer the Precautionary Principle, which, in their view, is 'committed to fairness within and beyond this generation'. Indeed, CBA also tends to ignore, and often to reinforce, patterns of social inequality, above all because it pays no attention to a key question, which is distributional: who receives the benefits and who incurs the costs? Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasise the importance of fairness. If environmental threats mostly burden poor people, regulators should take that point into account, whatever the cost-benefit ratio.

We see you pretending,

trying to force us to pretend fear into silence like you.

I didn’t finish the walk. Maybe it would be more right o r more precise, to say that, I couldn’t get myself to finish. I couldn’t circle the area in a loop, a connected line, a curve with a starting and ending point identical.

Charts, diagrams, lies you display on news broadcasts

to prove to your daughter you’re trying something.

Stories I won’t tell mine because I won’t be having one.

You’re trying to convince us you’ve priced it high enough,

the priceless values of life, health, nature, the future.

Another dimension to ‘ethical’ decision-making encompasses the ‘varieties of goodness,’ which describes the other ways that the value in the natural environment exists (Sagoff). Indeed, we appreciate nature because it is the object of aesthetic admiration and wonder. We need not think of nature simply as a source of welfare. Rather, we respect nature: we treat it with loyalty, affection, even reverence (Sagoff). Objects of ethical and aesthetic judgments do not as such have economic value but moral and aesthetic value; as the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote, they have a dignity, not a price. I’m w a i t i n g and a bird flies through dry leaves. Environmental decisions should not be based on what is economically efficient, but also highlights that decisions are not based on such a premise anyway. In fact, it is strange to draw a binary and dichotomous account of environmental decision-making that pins economic efficiency against ethics, when other dimensions also inform environmental decisions; such as the protection of human rights, electoral costs to incumbent leaders, political bargaining in the international arena, or even degrees of scientific knowledge. Buzzing, I’m vibrating for an answer because it’s time for alcohol. I know I shouldn’t have any. I know if I start, I won’t end until I see a message from you on my screen. I’ve lasted, this e l o n g a t e d in nerves, for this long. But I’m starting to parch. Ultimately, granting rights to different entities, such as future generations, rivers, or the Great Barrier Reef, could be a means of reinforcing precaution and protecting the needs and interests of current and future generations. Additionally, this could render environmental decision-making less anthropocentric. It could help reinstate normative priorities and conceptual coherence (Kysar 2012). Perhaps the strongest critique of models of economic efficiency for decision-making is the trivialising of the future (discounting). The concept of intergenerational justice, and constitutional rights for future generations could alleviate this problem.

Keep looking here or anywhere if you’d like then,

for evidence I’m not worth saving and no,

I’m not.

A baby cries, two doors and one floor down, f o r milk or a hug or something, who knows.

If it was between me and the world

I’d pick the right choice too.

Market allocation cannot overtake political deliberation with respect to policies that involve moral or aesthetic judgement (Sagoff).

It’s ending soon and so, I’ll be sitting down.

One leg tucked under my thigh.

The r e s p o n s e I’ve been waiting for, it still hasn’t arrived. What are the implications of using cost-benefit analyses borrowed from the realm of economics?

There’s a banquet still,

for me on sidewalks and grocery stores,

high on tides and in Birkenstocks;

next to dead wildflowers left on rocks on hikes,

inside rivers and the taste of blackberries,

laughing in the summertime.

What are the ‘ethical’ dimensions of decision-making: the social and distributional costs, the inequities? But n o w it’s pastime when I know people respond to others. Winding down from days spent thinking over mostly meaningless messages and work calls to email, the kind meant to distract us from the fact that we’re fading and fading, starting to turn translucent but p l e a s e, I hope tomorrow, to hear from you. What may a ‘rights-based’ approach to environmental decisions look like, so as to better draw the boundaries, ‘red-lines,’ in which economic efficiency models may operate?

I’ll eat anything.

TAKE THREE

The world is fucked, so let me eat. I’ll eat anything.

by Micaela Brinsley & Eponine Howarth

Micaela Brinsley (1997, Tokyo) is a writer, editor, translator, amateur painter and erstwhile theatre director. She’s an independent researcher of art history, and an essayist for A Women’s Thing. A graduate of NYU Tisch School of the Arts in new play development and critical theory, she writes, translates, interviews, curates, and edits for La Piccioletta Barca.

Eponine Howarth (5 September 1996, Brussels) is a Franco-British writer, editor, translator, footballer and lawyer. She researches modern slavery and forced labour at University College London. A graduate of the London School of Economics and the University of Cambridge in politics, international relations and human rights law, she currently writes poems, essays, pleadings, lists, and stories, and edits for La Piccioletta Barca.

Micaela Brinsley & Eponine HowarthOctober 13, 2023

OUT OF ORDER

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COSTS

HEADLINES

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